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This paper starts from the antitrust practices in the European Community and the US
with respect to the delineation of the relevant geographic market in dealing with
concentrations and shows that regulations and guidelines at this moment focus almost
exclusively on demand substitution. However, the process of globalisation involves
essentially global supply conditions and competition. A methodology is presented for
delineating the relevant geographic market, that better takes this globalisation trend
into account and brings both demand and supply substitution better in balance. The
practical use of the methodology is illustrated for the Volvo-Scania merger case that
was blocked by the European Commission in 1999.3
The globalisation of markets and production structures make it increasingly difficult
to define antitrust markets to identify possible dominant positions. With FDI
becoming more important than trade in terms of servicing foreign markets, markets
are becoming increasingly globalised and national production systems more and more
integrated through the activities of transnational corporations.
Considering the actual antitrust practices in the European Community and the US
with respect to the delineation of the relevant geographic market, regulations and
guidelines at this moment almost exclusively focus on demand substitution. However,
the process of globalisation involves essentially global supply conditions and
competition, and makes the interactions between global competitors a crucial element
in defining the relevant market. Moreover, the actual practices lack to consider
various market delineation criteria in a structured, hierarchical way, which sometimes
leads to unclear outcomes in cases where unequivocal evidence is considered.
This paper suggests a methodology for delineating the relevant geographic market,
which brings both demand and supply substitution better in balance and puts weights
on the different market delineation criteria.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses the actual regulation and
methods used in antitrust analysis for delineating the relevant market. It examines to
what extent actual merger regulations are suitable for dealing with the globalisation
phenomenon. Section 3 suggests a methodology to define the relevant geographic
market, combining both macro- and micro-level data. Section 4 applies the new
methodology to the proposed Volvo-Scania merger that was blocked by the European
Commission in 2000.4
GLOBALISATION AND THE DEFINITION OF THE RELEVANT
(GEOGRAPHIC) MARKET IN EC AND US ANTITRUST PRACTICE
Both in the EC
1 and US
2 antitrust law system dealing with concentrations, the
delineation of the relevant antitrust market is based on the abstract concept of the
exercise of monopoly power by a hypothetical monopolist. A relevant market is the
smallest grouping of sales for which the elasticity of demand and supply are
sufficiently low that a firm with 100% of that grouping, the hypothetical monopolist,
could profitably reduce output and increase price substantially above marginal cost or
the prevailing price. This approach focuses on the ability of companies (if acting
together) to exercise monopoly power over a well-defined product and geographic
space. A candidate market is called the relevant antitrust market if the hypothetical
monopolist can set a price in that market which is significantly higher than the
prevailing price (in the range of 5% to 10%), without major loss of sales (so-called 5
per cent or SSNIP-test (i.e. “small but significant non-transitory increase in price”)).
The concept of the hypothetical monopolist appears rather abstract and does not lend
itself to easy use in practice. Less abstract methods are used in the economic literature
to delineate relevant markets. Unfortunately, all suffer from major shortcomings
3.
Many of these tests are actually based on the principle of an economic market and
arbitrage by buyers rather than on the principle of a relevant antitrust market focusing
on the exercise of market power.
EC and US practice
                                                                
1 See EC Communication 97/C 372/03, point 17
2 See Section 1.21 MG5
The definition of the relevant geographic market used in the  European antitrust
regulation, originates from the United Brands case (case 27/76, ECR 1978). In 1997,
the most recent guidelines for defining the relevant market in EC competition law
were published (Notice on the Definition of Relevant Market for the Purposes of
Community Competition Law, EC Communication 97/C 372/03). In the Notice the
Commission recognises that firms are subject to three sources of competitive
constrains: demand substitutability, supply substitutability and potential competition.
However, the Notice further indicates that demand substitutability is seen as the most
important disciplinary force and therefore stresses its importance in the delineation of
the relevant market. Supply-side substitutability may only be taken into account in
defining markets in those situations where its effects are equivalent to those of
demand substitution in terms of effectiveness and immediacy
4. In other words, the
Commission’s approach in deciding whether different products or regions should be
included in the same relevant market depends almost exclusively on their
substitutability from the perspective of the consumer
5.
In the US Merger Guidelines, Section 7 of the Clayton Act forms the basis for the
requirement that a merger be evaluated within the relevant geographic market. In its
original form, it prevents the elimination or lessening of competition between the
merging parties, and the creation of a monopoly in any line of trade in any section or
community. In the Brown Shoe case (Brown Shoe vs. US (370 U.S. 294)) the
                                                                                                                                                                                         
3 We refer to Sleuwaegen et al. (1999) for an extensive overview and a discussion of the methods.
4 See EC Communication 97/C 372/03, par. 20
5 Practically, the Commission commonly takes several factors into account in its analysis of the
definition of the relevant geographic market, which can be grouped in two categories: sources of
globalisation (e.g. language, consumer preferences/brand loyalty, transportation costs), and so called
‘revealed measures’ of globalisation (e.g. price differences, cross-border import), i.e. indicators that
may point in the direction of globalisation/segmentation. Nevertheless, the Commission exercises
considerable discretion in deciding which factors are influential in any particular case, and rarely
highlights any single characteristic as determining the relevant geographic market. It is therefore no
guaranty whatsoever to assume that because, for example, a particular level of trade was taken to6
Supreme Court set out the basis for definition of the relevant antitrust market. The
1997 US Merger Guidelines further describe how this definition is to be applied in the
context of geographic market analysis of a merger. As in the EC merger regulation,
the definition of the relevant market in the US Merger Guidelines is based first and
foremost on demand substitution factors, i.e. possible consumer responses. But,
whereas the EU Merger Regulation takes supply-side substitutability into account in a
second stage, the US Merger Guidelines explicitly mention that market definition
focuses solely on demand substitution factors. Supply substitution factors are
considered elsewhere in the Guidelines in the identification of firms that participate in
the relevant market and the analysis of entry
6.
In minimising the role of supply substitution and potential entry both the US and EC
guidelines largely ignore the role of corporate globalisation. The phenomenon of
globalisation involves essentially global competition and its effect on business and
company organisation focuses mainly on supply substitution (Dicken, 1998). Already
in 1996 the US Federal Trade Commission recognised this trend in a report on the
implications of globalisation for competition policy. Among other things the report
concluded that “relevant geographic markets should be defined to include foreign
supply response as appropriate, giving due regard both to actual barriers to trade and
to the increasing trend towards the globalisation of trade and services”. However, so
far it has not been amended in the Merger Guidelines.
RELEVANT GEOGRAPHIC MARKET DELINEATION IN A GLOBAL
ECONOMY: A NEW METHODOLOGY
                                                                                                                                                                                         
indicate a Community-wide market in one case, a similar level of trade could lead to the same
conclusion in another case (Cook and Kerse, 2000).7
Starting from the problems set out in the previous section, this section proposes an
integrating methodology to delineate the geographic scope of the relevant market that
brings both demand and supply substitution better in balance. First, price data and
shipments data are used in connection with border effects to define the economic
market, based on buyer arbitrage principles. Next, the analysis is extended to consider
possible supply responses and define the relevant competitive arena. Micro-economic
data are used to get an indication of how firms actually perceive the relevant market
by analysing their strategic market behaviour. In combination both sources of
information provide a reliable indication of the ‘global’ scope of the relevant antitrust
market.
Price Data, Shipments Data and Geographic Market Delineation
Price differences between two regions are a first good way to delineate economic
markets. A considerable price difference between two geographic areas is assumed to be
a good indication of the impossibility of buyers to arbitrate price differences away.
Mostly a price difference of about 10% or more is considered a significant threshold to
separate markets. These price differences should be observed for a specific period of
time, say minimum 2 years. Prices to compare should also be actual transaction
prices, which may differ significantly from listed prices. Several market delineation
tests are based on price tests
7. Price differences between regions, however, do not imply
that firms do not consider competitors’ reactions from the other region in setting prices.
                                                                                                                                                                                         
6 See Section 1.0, 1.3 and 3 MG
7 e.g. price correlations test (Stigler & Sherwin, 1985), price equality test (Shrieves, 1978), speed of
adjustment test (Mathis et al., 1978), Granger causality (Klein et al., 1985), cointegration series (Engle &
Granger, 1987)8
Elzinga and Hogarty (1973, 1978) suggest a method to delineate geographic markets,
based on interregional shipments. They argue that the presence of shipments between
two geographic areas is an indication of the fact that the areas should actually be
regarded as one single market. The method is constructed by the application of two tests:
the LOFI (“Little Out From Inside”) and the LIFO (“Little In From Outside”) test. If
both 75% (or alternatively 90%) of the consumption of a product is produced within a
specific area, and 75% (or 90%) of the production within this area is consumed within
this area, then a distinct geographic market has been identified.
Shrieves (1978) extends this shipments test by calculating two criteria: the similarity
measure and the significance measure. The similarity measure considers whether the
patterns of shipments into the two areas under consideration are similar, while the
significance measure measures the importance of the two areas for total consumption of
the product concerned. Because of several difficulties in the actual application of the test,
the Shrieves-test is not widely used.
Criticism. The approach of Elzinga and Hogarty (and also Shrieves (1978)) to
delineate the relevant geographic market has received a lot of criticism in the
economic literature.
Werden (1981) identifies two important situations in which the proposed test will
produce erroneous results.
Firstly, if there are no cross shipments between the regions at a particular point in time,
both Elzinga and Hogarty and Shrieves conclude that the two are distinct geographic
markets. However, if the cross-price-elasticities of demand are very high, a cartel in one
of these regions would not be able to profitably raise price and the two regions are not in
fact, distinct markets. In other words, potential shipments and competition from firms9
outside the region is not taken into account. However, potential competition from
producers outside the region may threaten producers in this region to such an extent that
they will keep prices down. The fundamental dependence of the patterns of shipments
and the size of the relevant geographic market on price settings behaviour has been
illustrated in Scherer and Ross (1990).
The second major error that the proposed shipments tests make, involves failing to
delineate important markets within markets. They fail because they do not really
consider what the firms could do after the possible merger. The test is not suited to
determine whether producers in any region could raise prices significantly through
collective action, because it is entirely based on actual shipments data and it does not
indicate what will happen in case of a price increase. Therefore, in some situations
markets will be defined too broadly, and potential anti-competitive mergers will not be
detected.
Werden (1981) concludes however that, despite the shortcomings of the tests, shipments
data can be very useful. Firstly, they can be used to establish a first cut from which to
work in delineating relevant geographic markets. Secondly, they establish an
understanding of product flow patterns, which is the quintessence of the geographic
market delineation process. In using trade data, the focus should be on trade between
independent parties. Intra-firm trade does not necessarily respond to demand conditions,
but basically reflects the international integration of supply activities of firms.
Also Stigler and Sherwin (1985) state that the physical movement of goods (or buyers) is
a potential source of information on the geographic size of the market. However, they
argue that no volume of physical movement of goods can actually insure that two areas
are in the same market. For instance, competition from mobile buyers can bring about
price equality without a movement of the good in question in its primary form.10
Moreover, the fact that a substantial amount of a product is shipped from one area to
another is not sufficient to guarantee that both areas should be in the same market. They
are separate economic markets if price discrimination is causing the price in one region
to be lower than in the other region.
The different points of criticism cannot be overlooked. Consequently, the shipments
method can never provide a definitive answer in its own to the geographic market
delineation problem. However, they can provide a first indication of whether certain
geographic areas should be grouped as one economic market.
Price tests can best be combined with a “trade exposure measure”, in line with the
shipments test, to come to a first indication of the economic market. The idea of using
trade level data to get an indication of intercountry links can also be found in the
literature about the definition of global industries (Porter, 1986; Yip, 1995; Makhija et al,
1997). In line with the arguments of Elzinga and Hogarty (1973,1978), it is essential to
take both the LIFO test and the LOFI test into consideration. The trade exposure
measure, as discussed in Sleuwaegen (1994), appears as a good indicator in this context.
This trade exposure measure XM divides the sum of the exports and imports by the sum
of all shipments (i.e. domestic sales+export+imports).
In order to refine this economic market definition and to meet the basic criticisms on the
use of price difference and shipments data in the relevant market delineation process, the
next step is to learn more about the economics that produce the observed shipments
patterns, i.e. transportation costs, regulations, … which as a result may lead to the
identification of border effects separating markets.
Border Effects11
Extensive research has been done to measure and explain sources of market
fragmentation. In this literature, the formation of the European Union and the Single
Market Program formed an interesting real-life case study. Neven and Roller (1991)
estimated the impact of non-tariff barriers on the share of EU imports in apparent
consumption of the four major European countries for the years 1975-1985, making use
of Buigues et al. (1990) to measure non-tariff barriers. Fontagné et al. (1998) studied the
impact of the Single Market Programme (SMP) on intra-European trade. They estimate
in particular whether the removal of remaining barriers to trade changed the proportion
of inter-industry, horizontally differentiated and vertically differentiated trade. In more
recent work, Head and Mayer (1998) empirically examined how non-tariff barriers affect
consumption of foreign goods relative to consumption of domestic goods, making use of
the empirical construct of border effect.
Border effects measure the extent to which domestic geographic subunits trade more
with each other than with foreign units of identical size and distance. Borders matter
when firms have greater access to domestic consumers than to consumers in other
nations. Border effects are measured as the average deviation between actual trade and
the ‘normal trade’ that would be expected in an integrated economy without border-
related barriers.
The literature on border effects was established by McCallum (1995) who analysed trade
between Canadian provinces and between US states and Canadian provinces. In his
analysis he made use of gravity-type equations to examine the determinants of
international trade patterns, including the impact of preferential trade blocs. McCallum
(1995) and Helliwell (1996) showed that the border effect on US-Canadian trade for the
period 1988-1990 was extremely large. Trade between Canadian provinces was12
estimated to be more than 20 times larger than trade between Canadian provinces and
US states.
For the European Union, Head and Mayer (1998) were the first to estimate industry-level
border effects at the industry level. The methodology they use is the monopolistic
competition model of trade introduced by Krugman (1980). That model establishes a
relation between the relative amounts consumers spend on foreign and domestic goods
and their relative prices net of transport costs. The border effect measures divergence
from the predicted consumption ratios. Table 1 presents the border coefficients for 98
industries across European Union countries before the implementation of the Single
Market Programme
8.
Insert Table 1 about here
Starting from the border coefficients in table 1, there are several ways to express the
magnitude of border effects. First, the ratio of imports from self to imports from others,
holding other things equal, can be used (McCallum, 1995). For example, when the
border coefficient for pharmaceuticals is 3.66, the magnitude of the border effect is
exp(3.66) = 38.86. This means that trade in the pharmaceutical industry within an EU
country is 38.86 times larger than trade between countries of the EU. A second way to
quantify border effects is to convert them to distance equivalents. This approach can be
found in Helliwell (1996) a.o. Given that the ‘normal’ distance coefficient in the gravity-
equation is equal to - 0.95, crossing a border in the pharmaceutical industry is equivalent
to multiplying distance by exp(-3.66/-0.95) = 46.99. Since the average internal distance
in the EU is 135 miles, this implies a border “width” in the pharmaceutical industry of13
6344 miles. Head and Mayer (1998) found that, on average across industries, for the
period 1984-1986 crossing a border was equal to bridging a distance of 3206 miles.
In table 1 the industries are ordered in terms of increasing magnitude of border effects. It
seems noteworthy that ingestible products, i.e. food, beverages, tobacco and drugs,
figure heavily among those with large border effects.
When examining the evolution of border effects over time (period 1976 to 1995), Head
and Mayer found that border effects within Europe
9 have declined substantially until
1986, but that border effects remained stable since then.
In another article, Head and Mayer (2000) compare industry-level border effects
between Europe, the US and Japan on average for the period 1981-1994. The results
show some interesting elements about the level of integration within Europe, as
compared to trade with Japan or the US (see table 2).
Insert Table 2 about here
As a first element Head and Mayer found that in general trade between the EU and Japan
or the US in the 80’s suffered much more from domestic preferences than intra-EU
trade. The border effects can give a good indication of the level of trans-regional
globalisation (i.e. a level of globalisation that goes beyond the borders of the EU) of a
specific industry.
Combining Border Effects with Shipments and Price Difference Data
                                                                                                                                                                                         
8 In the study Head and Mayer (1998) pooled the years 1984, 1985 and 1986.
9 Given the period of investigation, the authors consider Europe equal to EU9 (Belgium and
Luxembourg are aggregated), to avoid problems of countries that joint the EU entering the sample
during the period of investigation.14
The border effects technique provides an additional instrument to further refine the
delineation of economic markets based on shipments and price data. Combining price
data, shipments data and border effects, the following elements can be concluded:
￿  The non-existence of  price differences between regions suggests an  integrated
economic market.
￿  If in a specific industry shipments between regions are taking place on a regular
basis, no border effects are present but prices differ between regions, this is an
indication that firms are able to segment the market following the geographical
regions.
￿  If shipments are taking place between regions, but border effects do exist, then
the market may be considered to be  separated by these border effects. The
likelihood is high that prices will differ between regions in this case.
￿  If there are no shipments between regions and no border effects are present for a
specific industry, then the market for that industry can be considered as local.
￿  If no shipments are taking place, but if border effects exist for that industry, then
the market is closed and firms are most likely organised following a local or
multidomestic structure.
Schematically:
Insert Figure 1 about here
In all the cases discussed above, it is not possible to simply conclude that the relevant
antitrust markets correspond to the economic markets, delineated thus far. Surprisingly,15
actual antitrust practices within the EU and the US suggest that relevant market analysis
often stops here. However, accounting for the fact that information and communication
technology and new production technology has led to a great flexibility in geographical
production structures (Dicken, 1998), transnational firms can easily penetrate regions
and exercise a disciplinary effect on the behaviour of firms in economically fragmented
markets. Additional information about the geographical pattern of supply and
competition should therefore be used to come to conclusions about the relevant
“antitrust” market.
Global Supply Response and Global versus Multimarket Competition
If there is one central characteristic of globalisation of firms and industries, it is the
effective response in supplying goods and services to customers scattered around the
world. This not merely happens by means of trade but increasingly by setting up
production and distribution units in various parts of the world. This global flexibility in
supply response should be explicitly considered in delineating relevant antitrust markets.
Hence, in assessing the scope of the market and arena of relevant competitors, measures
should be developed that are able to take this supply flexibility into account. Logically,
intra-firm trade could give a good indication of the global flexibility within a company.
However, data on intra-firm trade are rarely available.
Davies and Lyons (1996) present a useful alternative measure. They define a globally
integrated industry as an industry in which corporate strategies are integrated. They
suggest that whilst a market may only be integrated given the absence of price
differences or significant trade flows, the industry or relevant competitive arena may be
integrated by multinational production as well as sales, the latter two being taken as16
evidence of integrated corporate strategies. The degree of multinationality of supply at
the level of the industry is defined as:
Mj = S (Mij*vij)
where  Mij = the individual firm i’s multinationality in industry j
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In its number-equivalent form this becomes:
NMj = (1 – Mj)
-1
An industry characterised by integrated corporate strategies will show a high NM and
thus a high degree of multinationality in sales as well as in production.
The idea behind this measure is that the more firms are multinational within an industry,
the more likely that firms can easily shift production from one country to another and
that competitive reactions will occur across markets. The multinationality measure
captures not only the impact of trade on competitive conditions through the
multinationality of sales, but also supply flexibility through foreign direct investment is
captured through the multinationality of production. Such foreign direct investments are
as much a source of potential supply response in a global economy as is trade. This is
recognised in the 1997 UN World Investment Report, but has yet not been explicitly
taken into account in either EC or US competition laws.
Not all markets in which multinationals operate are globally integrated or characterised
by global competitors that may operate in fragmented economic markets. Therefore, a17
high degree of multinationality requires additional insight in the geographical presence
and profiles of the different competitors in the industry. If the same sellers are present in
more than one economic market, this should be explicitly considered in the application
of the market-delineation principle. Given multimarket presence of the same firms, i.e.
the same firms meet in different markets, their competitive actions are not taken in
isolation across markets. A firm’s action most probably implies reactions from other
actors in that market or another economic market where they meet. The interdependence
of firms across product markets has first been hypothesised by Edwards (1964):
“When one large conglomerate enterprise competes with another, the two are likely to
encounter each other in a considerable number of markets. The multiplicity of their
contacts may blunt the edge of competition. A prospect of advantage from vigorous
competition in one market may be weighed against the danger of retaliatory forays by
the competitor in other markets. Each conglomerate competitor may adopt a live-and-let-
live policy designed to stabilise the whole structure of the competitive relationship. Like
nation states, the great conglomerates may come to have recognised spheres of influence
and may hesitate to fight local wars vigorously because the prospect of local gain are not
worth the risk of general warfare.”
Multimarket competition involves rivalry among the same group of firms in a set of
related (product or geographic) markets. Since firms often compete in different
economic markets with costs that are interrelated across these markets (e.g. through the
use of joint input), the actions taken in one market may provoke important direct and
indirect (strategic) adjustment effects in the other markets. One central result of the
multimarket theory implies that firms that are more equal competitors across products18
or geographic markets will refrain from taking unbalanced aggressive competitive
actions (Van Wegberg, 1993). When the same firms meet in different markets, this
facilitates multimarket collusion (Bernheim and Whinston; 1990, Fenley, 1985). The
result of multimarket competition may after some time be a reduction in competition
(Caves, 1982), if the payoff of the co-operative outcome across markets exceeds
individual competitive profits (Kantarelis and Veendorp, 1988). This interrelatedness has
important implications for relevant antitrust market delineation. In such cases the
relevant market is larger than the different economic markets and includes all markets
subject to co-ordinated actions by multimarket competitors (Sleuwaegen, 1994).
In empirical studies about multimarket competition (Scott, 1982, 1991; Hughes and
Oughton, 1993) two more refined measures for multimarket competition have been used.
Scott (1982, 1991) focuses on the probability that given the observation that two firms
are already rivals in one market, that they will also meet up in other spheres of activity.
Given that firms do follow some sort of strategy when diversifying in order to exploit
e.g. economies of scope from production or marketing, it seems likely that firms will
meet in several of their markets, but whether they do this ‘purposively’ to increase
multimarket contact is another matter. Scott’s hypothesis regarding the level of
multimarket competition is that the lower the number of industries in which the two
companies meet relative to their total number of operations, the smaller the likelihood
that they will recognise their mutual interdependence. More formally, he measures the
probability distribution over the number of ways a ‘representative’ pair of firms can meet
in their other markets, given that they were initially observed to be operating in the same
market.
Hughes and Oughton (1993) measure the degree of multimarket contact through the
calculation of the pair wise contact of the leading 5 firms in each country. If the19
multimarket measure spans the world and reaches high values, multimarket competition
becomes global competition.
However, both measures of multimarket competition have limitations
10 and both
measures require a lot of specific data.
A more crude measure of multimarket contact can be found in Sleuwaegen and De
Voldere (1999). Based on the market shares and rankings of the different competitors in
the EU Member States, the relative positions of the competitors are determined. When
these relative positions do not differ strongly across the different Member States, it can
be concluded that the relevant competition arena is the European Union (or larger). If on
the other hand these relative positions do differ significantly, this can be interpreted as
different markets from a competition point of view.
A Comprehensive Framework for Delineating the Relevant Geographic Market
Bringing together the different building blocks set out in the previous paragraphs, the
following stepwise method appears useful to measure whether the scope of an antitrust
market is global, regional, national or local. Figure 2 shows how the different steps are
linked together to arrive at the delineation of the relevant geographic antitrust market.
Insert Figure 2 about here
In a first step the economic market can be defined combining price data, shipment data
and border effects. If no price differences are found, the markets are integrated and
should be treated also as global antitrust markets. For fragmented economic markets, the
information should be complemented with information about the scope of possible
supply and competitive reactions to correct the definition of the relevant market for20
competition. Therefore, in the next step data about the multinational presence of firms
should be examined to determine the “competition arena”.
As the framework set out above contains all essential ingredients to delineate antitrust
markets, the collection and processing of the necessary data at the level of products of
individual firms may appear cumbersome. However, we believe that the value of the
framework lies in the systematic approach it provides to process the information
provided by the parties in merger cases. In unravelling the underlying causalities, the
framework does not merely assemble information, but also builds up cumulative
evidence to arrive at a more solid market delineation outcome.
VOLVO–SCANIA
The Volvo–Scania merger, which was blocked by the EU Commission in early 2000,
provides a nice illustration of the applicability of the new methodology to delineate
the relevant geographic market. The first paragraph introduces the case and discusses
the final decision by the European Commission. In the second paragraph the case is
discussed against the background of the methodology developed in the paper.
Volvo-Scania Merger: EU Commission Decision
In autumn 1999 the EU Commission received notification of a concentration by which
Volvo proposed to acquire control of Scania. Volvo and Scania are both Swedish
companies, mainly active in the manufacture and sales of trucks, buses, marine and
industrial engines. Through the proposed operation the new group was about to
                                                                                                                                                                                         
10 For a discussion of these limitations we refer to Lund (1993).21
acquire a substantial share of the market for heavy trucks in the EEA
11. During its
investigation, the Commission came to the conclusion that the proposed operation
would be incompatible with the common market. The Commission concluded that
Sweden, Norway, Finland and Ireland constituted separate relevant geographic
markets for heavy trucks and that in these geographic markets the operation would
create dominant positions, which would result in competition being significantly
impeded in the common market within the meaning of Article 2(3) of the Merger
Regulation and Article 57 of the EEA Agreement.
To delineate the relevant geographic market, the Commission cumulated different
elements of evidence pointing in that direction. However, the decision was not taken
without any discussion. The evidence in the Volvo-Scania merger case was anything
but clear-cut. For almost each argument against the merger, an argument in favour
was advanced. Moreover, as no real hierarchy exists among the criteria that the
Commission used in its investigation, for the elements where conflicting or divergent
evidence was presented, the Commission’s approach appears as arbitrary.
Assessment of the Volvo-Scania Case using the New Methodology
Although also the new methodology is based on cumulating different kinds of
evidence to come to a conclusion on the delineation of the geographic market, it also
brings more structure and a clear hierarchy in the different elements taken into
account by the Commission. Additionally, the methodology looks for the reasons of
possible market fragmentation. Based on the methodology a ranking can be suggested
of the criteria taken into account by the EU Commission for delineating the
geographic market. It suggests to first look at the following ‘revealed measures’ of
                                                                
11 The Commission also investigated the competitive position of the Volvo-Scania group in the EEA
buses market. However, in this case study only the heavy trucks market will be discussed.22
globalisation: price differences and trade flows. In a second step regulatory barriers to
market interpenetration (analogously with border effects) should be examined, to
come to a meaningful definition of the economic market. In the last step,
multinationality of production, competitors’ information and market share differences
should be analysed to define the relevant antitrust market. In the next paragraphs this
stepwise procedure will be used in discussing the Volvo-Scania case.
In the Volvo-Scania case, for heavy trucks significant price differences have been
observed among the different EU Member States, even after correction of prices for
differences in model specifications differing by country (Commission calculations,
see Commission Decision case n° COMP M.1672-Volvo/Scania par. 38-49).
Secondly, shipments between the Member States are limited (COMP M.1672-
Volvo/Scania). In this context a distinction should be made between intra-firm trade
and inter-firm trade. While total trade (i.e. intra- and inter-firm trade) is significant,
most trade in the transportation industry is intra-firm trade. When looking only at
cross-country inter-firm shipments, these amounts are minor, thus pointing in the
direction of more national than European markets.
The observations that prices differ strongly across the Member States and that there
are few shipments provide a first indication of fragmented economic markets. In
observing the limited volume of shipments, the question arises whether external
factors, i.e. border effects, cause the market to be fragmented or whether markets are
just local in nature. When regulatory barriers are high, border effects will be high,
thus indicating a closed market. If, on the other hand, border effects are low, the
market is local.
In the heavy trucks industry border effects are high, due to regulatory barriers. Despite
some harmonisation at the European level, regulatory barriers still fragment the23
market. For example, in the UK and Ireland all vehicles must be adapted for right-
hand drive. This heavily weights on the possibility to import vehicles from other
countries. Also across Member States different regulations still apply as concerns
permitted total transported tonnage and maximum length of trucks. In Sweden, the
truck industry law requires a specific homologation –called “cab crash test”. This last
regulation constitutes a severe regulatory barrier to enter this industry.
The third step of the methodology explicitly pays attention to supply substitution and
the way the production structure is globally or European wide organised by examining
the production and sales structure. Next, by examining competitors’ presence, the
degree of multimarket competition can be established. In the heavy trucks industry
multinationality in production is very limited, with production on average
concentrated in 1,5 countries, thus insufficient for efficient European wide supply
flexibility (table 3). Multinationality in sales is significantly higher. In the EU, the
largest truck manufacturers are on average active in 4,6 countries, with Volvo and
Scania having the highest degree of multinationality in sales (table 4). When looking
at the patterns of multinationality (multimarket presence), it can be seen from table 5
that for heavy trucks the arena of competition is still dominated by national players
that do meet in several countries, but not as equal competitors. The most remarkable
examples are Volvo and Scania in Sweden, Daimler in Germany and Iveco in Italy. In
most other countries market presence of the largest truck manufacturers seems to be
more balanced.
Insert Table 3 about here
Insert Table 4 about here24
Insert Table 5 about here
Combining all the elements, it can be concluded that the geographic antitrust market
in the truck industry is at this moment certainly not the EU or the European Area.
Despite some harmonisation over the years, the market for heavy trucks appears still
fragmented at the national level. This fragmentation in the truck industry is mainly
due to regulatory barriers. Although no global/European supply flexibility exists, most
large truck manufacturers are active with sales in all EU Member states - although
with substantial variations in market shares, especially in the Nordic countries. On a
European level, this suggests a tendency towards a multimarket competition outcome
with strategic interaction over the different national markets, rather than one
integrated European market. With competitors present in different markets.
Competition emerges across European Member States, albeit that some Nordic
countries appear isolated. All in all and in line with the decision of the Commission,
the new methodology would suggest to block the merger based on the different
criteria. However, as the methodology has identified a fragmentation mainly caused
by government regulation, it would strongly advice for a further harmonisation of
regulations at the EU level to come to one integrated European market.25
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TABLE 1
Border Effects per Industry within the EU
Industry Coefficient   Industry Coefficient
Motor vehicles - ass and eng -0,06 Meat 2,27
Asbestos 0,14 Machine-tools 2,33
Motor vehicles - parts 0,55 Knitting 2,40
Electrical apps. - indl. 0,62 Industrial chem. n.e.s. 2,47
Textile n.e.s. 0,62 Soap 2,47
Steel tubes 0,89 Electrical plant 2,51
Machinery - misc 0,98 Footwear - mass 2,57
Machinery - agricultural 1,01 Clocks 2,59
Office machinery 1,06 Wires 2,71
Household chem. n.e.s. 1,17 Oils and fats 2,72
Man-made fibres 1,18 Fish 2,74
Non-ferrous metals - prod. 1,24 Wooden furniture 2,81
Transmission eq. 1,27 Wood - processed 2,82
Receivers - TV and radio 1,28 Confectionery 2,89
Industrial chem. 1,35 Cork and brushes 2,97
Electrical apps. - domestic 1,36 Clothing 3,00
Machinery n.e.s. 1,37 Railway 3,03
Abrasives 1,44 Aerospace 3,04
Steel-preprocess 1,45 Printing 3,31
Optical ins. 1,47 Metals transformation 3,34
Furs 1,53 Paint and ink 3,47
Glass 1,60 Shipbuilding 3,52
Lighting eq. 1,61 Motor vehicles - bodies 3,52
Musical instr. 1,64 Graphic labs 3,59
Toys and sports 1,67 Foudries 3,61
Ceramics 1,72 Structural metal 3,63
Leather-tanning 1,74 Pharmaceuticals 3,66
Floor coverings 1,78 Dairy 3,97
Cycles 1,79 Distilling 4,04
Jewelery 1,79 Grain milling 4,08
Machinery - engineering 1,82 Used tyres 4,08
Transport eq. n.e.s. 1,82 Metal containers 4,09
Pulp and paper 1,83 Bread 4,10
Starch 1,86 Food n.e.s. 4,22
Wood n.e.s. 1,87 Pasta 4,25
Stone 1,91 Tobacco 4,32
Machinery - textile 1,94 Clay 4,34
Precision instr. 2,01 Beer 4,51
Tools etc. 2,04 Wine 4,57
Telecoms 2,06 Poultry 4,66
Vegetables 2,07 Soft drinks 4,73
Machinery - food and chem. 2,09 Concrete 4,73
Textiles-households 2,14 Cement 4,74
Iron and steel 2,15 Forging 4,86
Plastics 2,19 Wooden containers 5,38
Rubber 2,23 Wood - sawing 5,47
Leather - products 2,24 Oil refining 5,69
Medical eq. 2,26 Carpentry 5,97
Paper processing 2,27   Sugar 6,40
Source: Head and Mayer, 199831
TABLE 2
Industry-level Border Effects for EU9, Japan and USA
Industry EU9 Japan USA Industry EU9 Japan USA
Jewellery 4,07 0,06 0,09 Rubber 11,16 62,76 102,11
Leather tanning 3,31 0,30 0,57 Railway 30,18 63,25 22,40
Ceramics 5,75 0,67 4,76 Pulp and paper 8,87 68,24 6,27
Textile n.e.s. 2,77 0,75 2,61 Clocks 8,72 73,36 318,74
Industrial chem. 3,71 0,77 1,87 Electrical plant 17,33 76,69 80,86
Shipbuilding 22,91 0,79 1,72 Machinery - engineering 12,99 82,47 61,43
Optical ins. 2,9 0,88 4,24 Steel - preprocess 8,3 87,96 78,25
Machinery - misc. 2,44 0,98 2,85 Wooden furniture 30,8 91,44 121,76
Cycles 6,23 0,99 7,72 Non-ferrous metals-prod. 7,61 94,75 25,10
Telecoms 13,37 1,04 1,73 Starch 13,84 95,35 0,58
Steel tubes 3,21 1,08 5,27 Receivers - TV and radio 12,73 108,94 217,65
Toys and sports 4,38 1,13 4,73 Clothing 25,11 109,64 196,50
Abrasives 4,32 2,32 3,15 Knitting 8,3 124,12 200,47
Asbestos 4,82 2,40 2,06 Furs 5,03 127,55 44,01
Man-made fibres 1,79 2,44 6,88 Aerospace 15,75 129,50 44,83
Musical instr. 7,1 2,61 12,45 Motor vehicles - ass and eng 11,43 140,71 3675,35
Floor coverings 4,79 2,92 4,95 Pharmaceuticals 25,28 141,07 37,64
Machinery - textile 4,33 3,33 2,64 Oil refining 109,34 167,74 4,21
Stone 11,41 3,51 6,94 Wires 62,47 193,40 91,46
Machinery n.e.s. 4,45 3,57 4,99 Plastics 20,35 209,38 74,74
Glass 8,77 4,91 10,22 Meat 9,9 220,67 6,81
Electrical apps. - domestic 5,3 4,93 14,63 Textiles - households 27,85 226,76 78,27
Electrical apps. - indl. 11,67 5,27 12,49 Metal containers 65,78 246,82 72,91
Leather - products 6,77 5,32 18,62 Poultry 66,53 298,96 39,50
Machinery - agricultural 4,41 6,75 6,07 Printing 67,42 322,11 67,42
Precision instr. 6,89 8,96 8,05 Bread 84,36 542,28 1672,74
Transmission eq. 4,84 10,62 16,86 Vegetables 14,83 609,74 65,10
Metals transformation 35,61 10,91 9,25 Forging 72,51 680,32 116,32
Iron and steel 4,81 11,06 66,20 Grain milling 55,94 690,27 17,28
Medical eq. 12,22 11,66 12,02 Pasta 51,34 715,12 2651,51
Office machinery 5,52 11,97 9,51 Sugar 101,91 863,75 270,12
Transport eq. n.e.s. 9,64 12,05 7,44 Tobacco 86,73 881,07 47,99
Household chem. n.e.s. 5,77 13,61 32,87 Structural metal 44,61 881,27 83,41
Oils and fats 23,91 14,71 2,21 Beer 127,64 1173,34 1013,31
Tools etc. 15,26 14,83 45,77 Clay 153,3 1269,59 2007,20
Paint and ink 31,37 17,18 11,43 Food n.e.s. 43,11 1838,30 697,06
Cork and brushes 19,3 17,90 21,04 Soft drinks 167,15 2097,10 1737,22
Wood n.e.s. 15,13 21,40 65,61 Wooden containers 303,62 2107,59 344,69
Lighting eq. 9,49 23,32 57,89 Motor vehicles - bodies 21,43 2160,35 287,08
Foundries 31,21 25,73 44,81 Wood - processed 29,38 2447,84 23,19
Soap 16,47 33,99 27,78 Confectionery 22,06 3232,41 712,41
Machinery - food and chem. 10,57 35,79 30,46 Wood - sawing 153,64 3881,25 33,21
Paper processing 16,51 36,23 88,37 Concrete 134,21 4124,43 300,81
Used tyres 25,68 37,89 25,68 Cement 385,06 7548,77 3188,06
Footwear - mass 7,46 41,18 17,16 Dairy 40,13 8937,64 2965,67
Fish 16,28 42,52 8,66 Motor vehicles - parts 13,14 9106,84 2895,63
Graphic labs 50,54 50,54 50,54 Carpentry 233,72 11500,94 1244,24
Machine-tools 12,95 53,15 66,10 Wine 259,29 66770,45 3986,76
Industrial chem. n.e.s. 10,68 62,21 22,63 Distilling 155,32 288681,60 1905,27
Source: Head and Mayer, 200032
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  Source: Annual reports, own calculations33
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 Source: Annual reports, own calculations34
TABLE 5
Market Share Variations in the Heavy Truck Industry (1998)
Volvo Scania Daimler MAN RVI Iveco DAF
EEA average 15.2 15.6 20.5 12.6 11.9 10.6 10.5
Sweden 45 46 6 0 1 0 2
Finland 34 31 10 3 18 4 0
Denmark 29 30 18 10 3 7 4
U.K. 18 19 9 7 6 9 18
Ireland 22 27 9 6 3 8 13
Germany 8 9 42 26 2 6 5
Austria 12 16 18 34 4 6 9
France 14 9 16 5 38 8 8
Belgium 23 17 18 11 8 6 17
Luxembourg 11 15 28 14 10 8 15
Netherlands 16 23 12 9 3 3 33
Italy 12 12 16 6 9 41 4
Spain 13 16 19 8 19 20 9
Portugal 25 19 12 6 17 7 14
Greece 24 17 36 12 3 2 3
Norway 38 32 9 12 1 2 4

























Identifying the Geographical Scope of the Relevant Antitrust Market
 Step 1: Defining the economic market







































Step 2: Confront economic market with supply/ competition forces37
Prof Dr LEO SLEUWAEGEN obtained his Ph D in Economics from the K.U.Leuven
in 1984. Currently he is Full Professor of Managerial Economics at the K.U.Leuven,
and part-time professor at the Erasmus University of Rotterdam. At the moment he is
the MBA director of the full-time international MBA programme of the Vlerick
Leuven Gent Management School.
ISABELLE DE VOLDERE obtained a degree as Commercial Engineer from the
K.U.Leuven in 1996. Currently she is Research Coordinator at the Vlerick Leuven
Gent Management School. Her research focuses mainly on globalisation, strategic
behaviour of firms and definition of the relevant antitrust market.